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The U.S. and other western economies are experiencing dramatic
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birthrates are the most important determinants of these changes in the post
war period. This paper examines the dynamic effects of baby "booms" and baby
"busts" on a range of economic variables using a perfect foresight life cycle
simulation model. In addition to describing general transition (as opposed
to simply long run) affects of fertility change, the paper considers alter-
native Social Security policies for avoiding sharp increases in long run
payroll tax rates. These include reductions in benefit replacement rates,
advances in Social Security's retirement age, taxation of social security
benefits, and the accumulation of a significant Social Security trust fund.
According to the simulated demographic transitions, the savings in
the U.S. fertility currently underway can have very major impacts on long run
factor returns and produce percipitous short term changes in saving rates.
While Social Security policy has important effects on the simulated
demographic transitions, these effects are of secondary importance to the long
run level of economic welfare. Even if payroll tax rates rise dramatically,
long run welfare (measured in terms of levels of adult consumption and
leisure) is, nonetheless, substantially higher in the case of a sustained drop
in the fertility rate. This reflects, in part, the decline in the number of
dependent children per adult; while a sustained decline in the fertility rate
eventually means a much larger ratio of elderly per capita, the decline in
children per capita means an overall decline in the long run ratio of depend-
ents to prime age workers in the economy. A second explanation for the simu-
lated long run welfare gains is capital deepening associated with lower
population growth rates.
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The 1983 Social Security reform act contains a number of significant
changes in the system's current and projected fiscal operations. These include
federal income taxation of half of Social Security benefits of high income
recipients starting in 1983, gradual increases in the normal retirement age
from 65 to 68 starting in 2000, and the expansion of coverage to new govern-
ment workers and to employees of non—profit organizations. If fully imple-
mented these provisions are projected (under intermediate IIB assumptions) to
close Social Security's OASDI, 15 year, open group deficit, with little or no
need for additional payroll tax increases beyond those currently stipulated in
law.
While the new legislation has greatly alleviated if not eliminated
OASDI's short term cash flow problems, the longer term financial picture
remains very much in doubt. There are four important reasons for continued
concern with and analysis of the system's long term finances. First, even if
all aspects of the new law are actually implemented, economic and demographic—2--
conditions close to the Social Security actuaries' pessimistic assumptions
mayprevail.In this case the OASDI deficit, expressed as a fraction of
taxable payroll, equals 22.1 percent over the period 2020 to 2056.
The second reason for continued concern about Social Security's long
term finances is that most of the long runfinancialsavings from the new
legislation arise from measures that are scheduled to be implemented. These
measures include increases in the retirement age and the gradual rise, through
inflationary bracket creep, in the fraction of Social Security recipients
whose benefits are taxed under the federal income tax. If future administra-
tions and Congresses periodically legislate away this bracket creep, or if they
delay or eliminate raising the retirement age, the nation will again face,
under intermediate assumptions, significantly higher OASDI tax rates in the
early part of the next century.
The third concern about the new legislation is closely tied to the
second. During the period 2000 to 2015, the ratio of the OASDI trust fund's
cummulative projected surplus to annual benefit payments rises from 2.3 to
5.14.Toput this figure in perspective, the current ratio of gross U.S. debt
to current Social Security benefits is roughly 4.5.Sincethe OASDI trust
fund holds its reserves in the form of government securities, the 1983 Act
implicitly projects Social Security's holding of a significant fraction, if
not all, of official government liabilities. While such an CASDI investment
policy raises questions of its own, there is the logically prior question of
whether future politicians will have the will to preserve a trust fund for
future generations that would represent over 5.14 years of benefits by 2015
(7.6 years under the 11—A assumptions). Such a surplus is unprecedented in—3—
the history of the program; the current OASDI reserve can cover less than 3
months of benefit payments. Rather than accumulate a large trust fund, future
politicians may dissipate the projected Social Security surplus by
legislating larger benefit payments, or by indexing federal income taxation of
Social Security benefits, or by reversing the scheduled retirement age
increases. Another, more subtle way in which this trust fund could he dissi-
pated involves the government running larger official deficits over this
period because they find the Social Security Trust Fund a ready purchaser of
these securities. From the perspective of the government's overall deficit
policy, such a program, in the extreme, simply transforms an implicit liabi-
lity into an explicit liability, and transfers concerns about major increases
in payroll tax rates into concerns about major increases in income tax rates.
The fourth concern about Social Security's long run finances
involves the very sizeable long term Medicare (HI) deficit projected by the
Senate Finance Committee. Under current law and using the actuaries' inter-
mediate Il—B assumptions, the HI deficit reaches 1.9 percent of taxable
payroll by 2030 and rises to 8.3 percent of taxable payroll by 2055.
The unsettled nature of Social Security's long term finances cer-
tainly provides ample rationale for analyzing Social Security and the
demographic transition. A second ntivation for the paper is the rather
limited understanding of the general equilibrium effects of demographic change
se on numerous macroeconomic variables, including savings, interest rates,
wage rates, and non— Social Security tax rates. While the U.S. is engaged in
a very dramatic demographic swing, the potential impact of the baby boom's
baby bust on general economic performance has received surprisingly little—4 —
attention.The dearth of research in this area probably reflects the dif-
ficulty in deriving analytic expressions for the time paths of economies
experiencing complex demographic change. This paper addresses the issue using
a dynamic life cycle simulation model that simultaneously considers a large
variety of economic choices and relationships.
Section II surm-rarizes several key findings of our previous modeling
of Social Security that ignored demographics. This discussion is helpful in
understanding the contribution of demographic change to the economy's dynamic
equilibrium. Section III describes the model's general characteristics
and its method of solution. The particular version of the model developed for
this analysis has a number of unique features, in particular the inclusion of
demographic factors in household saving behavior.
The fourth section presents two different types of demographic tran-
sitions for economies both with and without Social Security systems. The two
demographic changes considered are: (1) a baby bust involving an immediate and
sustained decline in birth rates and (2) a bust-boom—bust cycle of birth
rate changes that appears more closely to resemble the past 60 years of
U.S. fertility experience.
Section V examines four different policy alternatives to simply
raising Social Security payroll tax rates in response to the long term reduc-
tion in the fertility rate. These policy options are:(1) reductions in
Social Security's replacement rate, (2) increases in Social Security's retire-
ment age, (3) taxation of Social Security benefits under the income tax, and
4)accumulationof a trust fund through general revenue finance, interest on
which is used to help finance future Social Security benefit payments, Each—5-.
ofthese policies constitutes part of the government's current response to
Social Security's financial problems.
The simulations presented here, with a more elaborate general
equilibrium life cycle model, confirm several general conclusions reached in
Auerbach and Kotlikoff (l98I). First, demographic changes of the type
now projected require very major adjustments in Social Security's finances.
Second, while future young generations face a significant burden of supporting
parents, they also face a greatly reduced financial burden with respect to
child support. On balance, future young workers in the simulation model enjoy
higher standards of living than initial young generations under each of the
Social Security policy responses considered as well as the response of
annually adjusting Social Security payroll taxes to meet pre—specified benefit
payments.
The impact of demographic change on the simulated economy's time
path of economic variables is quite sizeabie. A major baby bust or cycles of
baby booms and busts are both capable of producing sharp increases and
declines in saving rates long before the demographic transition is complete. In
our base case simulation of a baby bust, the econonr's saving rate falls by 20
percent in the first year of the transition. It then rises over the next 20
years to a value in excess of that in the initial steady state. By year 50
the saving rate drops to less than two fifths of its initial value. A second
general finding concerning demographic transitions is that fertility cycles
are capable of producing major economic cycles in wages and interest rates. A
third feature of the simulations is that many of the more important changes in
economic variables coincide with the appearance in the workforce of baby boom
or baby bust generations.—6—
2. General Equilibrium Modelling of the I_of Social Security
The impact of Social Security on the economy is complicated, because
it involves so many aspects of individual behavior. General equilibrium simu-
lation models can be extremely helpful in assessing these effects. In two
previous papers we have used such models to evaluate particular effects of an
unfunded Social Security system. These models, as well as the one used in the
present paper, extend in various ways the basic model presented in Auerbach
and Kotlikoff (1983a). The basic model consists of three sectors: household,
government, and production. Most of the model's complexity lies in its charac-
terization of household decisions as being made, at any time, by 55
overlapping generations of adults, each saving to accumulate resources
according to an optimal, life—cycle consumption plan. Household behavior is
characterized by perfect foresight; i.e., the future wages, interest rates,
and tax rates anticipated by each household at each date are those that
actually occur.
In Auerbach and Kotlikoff (l983b) we examined the effect on capital
accumulation and welfare of an unfunded Social Security system, by adding such
a pay as you go system to the basic simulation model, maintaining the previous
assumption of fixed labor supply and retirement ten years before death (i.e.,
after )45 years of adulthood). We found that Social Security led to a substan-
tial decline in the nation's capital stock and in individual welfare. At the
same time, we showed that these significant effects could not be reliably
discerned by the use of time series regression models applied to the actual
data generated by the simulations themselves.
In Auerbach and Kotlikoff (l981), we extended the basic model in—T—
several important ways. First, following the techniques developed in
Auerbach, et.al. (1983c), we allowed labor supply to be endogenous. This
included the retirement decision itself. In addition, we added explicit
family structure. Instead of the previous assumption of adults being "born"
at age 21 and living for 55 years until age '(5, we posited that children
spend their first 20 years being supported by adults 20 years older. At age
21 children start their own families. The effect of this change was to
include children in each family's consumption decision for that family's first
20 years of existence. Finally, we added a second type of family to those
following the pure life cycle model of consumption behavior. This new type,
the "infinite horizon altruistic" family, engages in bequest behavior
reflecting a concern for the welfare of future generations.
A cost of all these additions was the inability, given the extensive
computation requirements, of solving for the model's transition. As a con-
sequence we restricted our analysis of the model to long run steady state
effects. Despite its long run focus, the heterogeneous preference model is
sufficiently rich to permit us to answer a number of new questions about the
impact of Social Security. Relevant to the current paper was our examination
of the effects of a decline in the annual population growth rate from 2 per-
cent to zero. The findings of this analysis include:
(i) With no other structural changes in Social Security, the
payroll tax must almost double in response to a population growth rate
drop from 2 to zero percent. This tax rate increase is necessary to
maintain benefits replacing 60 percent of average monthly earnings.
(2) Naintanence of the original payroll tax rate requires anincrease in the retirement age of between two and three years, a cut
in benefits of between one—third and two—fifths, or the accumulation
of a trust fund equal to 60 percent of one year's net national
product.
(3) Because of the method of Social Security benfit indexing, these
effects are unaffected by other changes in the economy, such as
changes in the real wage caused by movements in the capital—labor
ratio.
()Oncechildren are accounted for, the rise in payroll taxes
accompanying a slowdown in population growth need not portend lower
lifetime welfare per individual. Since fewer children must be fed
by each adult, more resources are made available for the adult's own
lifetime consumption. Regardless of the family's time horizon, we
found the representative adult living in the zero population growth
stead state enjoyed an increase in both consumption and leisure in
every year of life when population growth was lower.
These last results may or may not hold for generations during the
transition to the new steady state. Holding factor prices constant, interim
generations with few children, themselves large in number relative to their
parents, may be better off than those in the final steady state because their
Social Security tax rates are lower. However, changes in saving and labor
supply occuring during the transition alter factor returns, and one cannot
infer the welfare of transitional generations from information solely about
long run welfare.
The current model, while differing in several respects from that in—9—
Auerbach and Kotlikoff (198).), permits analysis of the precise demographic
transition and, consequently, the precise welfare affects of this transition
on particular generations. In order to simulate the demographic transition,
we have had to simplify the previous Auerbach—Kotlikoff (1981) model by
dropping the assumption of heterogeneous intertemporal preferences and con-
sidering only life—cycle families. We hope this restriction can be relaxed in
the future, though the solution of the heterogeneous model with fluctuating
cohort size assuming perfect foresight is a considerable and apparently very
computer—expensive challenge. In the next section we review the version of
the Auerbach—Kotlikoff simulation imdel used in this paper.
3. The Model and its Solution
The basic model with variable labor supply is described in detail in
Auerbach, et.al. (1983). The inclusion of children and Social Security is
described in Auerbach and Kotlikoff (l98)-). The reader is referred to these
papers for the relevant equations describing the behavior of households,
firms, the government in general, and the Social Security system in par-
ticular. We will summarize these relations briefly before describing how the
model is solved and how we have introduced changing fertility rates to the
simulations.
Households maximize a lifetime utility function based on the con—
sumption and leisure of adults from age 21 to 15 and their children from the
parents' age 21 to )4Q• The utility of parent and child is described by a
nested, constant elasticity of substitution utility function, with an inter—
temporal elasticity of substitution (between present and future consumption)—10-
of.25 and a static elasticity of substitution between current consumption and
leisure of .8. The pure rate of time preference in the function is equal to
1.5 percent. Children's consumption and leisure has a weight that increases
over time in their parent's objective function. As the child grows this
modeling leads to more consumption. The wage paid to particular age groups
follows a profile that rises steeply during childhood, continues to rise less
steepiy until mid.aLe age, ana then fajts or gradually. Thistypically leads
to a commencement of part—time work during the late teens and retirement
during the late 60s. Households have perfect foresight, in that the relevant
future parameters entering into their decisions are those that, in general
equilibrium,will actually prevail.
Firmsin the model are represented by a single, competitive firm
producingwith a constant—returns—to-scale, Cobb—Douglas production function
in labor and capital. The capital share in output is set at .25. Aside from
Social Security, the government'sfiscal policy involves financing a predeter-
minedpath of government consumption with a proportional income tax under the
constraintof annual budget balance. flien population structure changes, we
keep constant the level of government consumption expenditures per capita.
The Social Security System is financed bya flat rate payroll tax;
this tax pays for benefits received after the date of initial benefit receipt
based on a formula similar to the one actually used to calculate average
indexed monthly earnings (AIME). The model's calculated values of AIME are
multiplied by a replacement rate to arrive at the benefitlevel, Our baseline
assumptions are that benefits begin at age 65 and that the replacement rate is
60 percent. Because of their complexity, we ignore the ceiling on the payroll—11—
taxbase(nowquite high, anyway), the earnings test that currently prevails
between the ages of 65 and 12. and the early retirement provision available
between 62 and 65. We also assume that the payroll taxes themselves have no
work disincentive effects, i.e., are viewed as lump sum taxes by the worker.
The ndel is solved using a Gauss—Seidel procedure that begins with
guesses about aggregate stocks of capital and labor and uses these and the
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pathsplus tax rate paths provide time paths of net prices that households use
in determining their annual saving and labor supply. Aggregating household
saving and labor supply provides new estimates of the economy's capital stock
and labor force. Household factor supply, given the government's fiscal
constraints, also generates new guesses of the levels of income tax rates,
Social Security benefits, and Social Security System payroll tax rates. In
each iteration of the model these guesses about tax rates and benefits are
incorporated into the households' plans. Hence, when convergence is reached
(i.e., the guessed values of variables equal those computed based on these guesses),
households have taken account of the tax rates and benefits levels that
actually prevail in the perfect foresight equilibrium.
This general method of solution is applied first to the economy's
initial steady state, then to the final one to which the economy will con-
verge. Finally, we solve for the years of transition simultaneou, assuming
the transition is completed within 250 years. This simultaneous solution is
necessary because, with perfect foresight, future variables, such as the
interest rate, affect current decisions. We assume that the policy change
that led to the disturbance of the initial steady state was unanticipated, but-1 2—
that perfect foresight is iminmediately reestablished.
Fertility change is introduced into the model in the following way.
For a certain period after the beginning of the transition, we exogenously
specify the number of births per adult. Thereafter, a procedure is needed to
make the population's age structure converge to that of the new steady state.
Constancy of the birth rate will riot suffice, since the perfect regularity in
the birth cycle would perpetuate cohort size differences through an infinite
series of "echo effects." In the "real world," this happens to a very much
smaller extent because births are distributed over parents of different ages,
but such a solution would be infeasible for a simulation model. Instead, we
assume that, after a specified period time, typically 50 years, births equal
the number born the previous year times the annual population growth
rate of the final steady state. The impact of this modeling is that after at
most 15 additional years the population age distribution stablizes. This pro-
cedure makes the fertility rates themselves endogenous for a period, and they
may fluctuate somewhat unrealistically for a times However, experiments
varying the critical date at which fertility rates become endogenous suggest
that, as long as it is well after the posited demographic transition has
occured, this date hasnoimportant inf.luence on the basic nature of the
results.
4.BaselineSimulations: The Economic Effects of a Demographic Transition
In this section, we present simulation results for two types of
demographic transitions: a sudden and permanent reduction in the birth rate
(bust) and a cycle of decline and increase in the birth rate followed bya—13—
permanent drop ("bustboom—bust"). In the simulations of the bust transition,
the fertility rate drops from one involving a 3 percent rate of annual popula-
tion growth to one yielding a stationary population. In the second set of
simulations, containing the "bust—boom—bust" (BBB) fertility behavior, the
birthratedrops to one childper parent overa 5yearperiod. For the next
10yearsthe rate stays constant, after which itgradually rises reaching its
original level twenty years into the transition. Between years 20and35the
birth rate remains at this high value. It then gradually falls again to the
zeropopulation growth fertility rate between years 35and)45. The birth rate
remainsat thisleveluntil year 50, after which birth rates are endogenously
determined according to the requirement that a flat ZPG (zero population
growth) age structure isachieved by year 125 andthereafter. The model is
given an additional 125 years (a total of 250 years) toreacha new steady
state.
In all of our simulations we have had to introduce the assumption of
a positive government capital stock to generate plausible values for the
economy's capital-output ratio. This was not necessary in our previous life
cycle riodeling work because of the absence of children. With the consumption
needs of nonproductive children added to the population, life cycle behavior
basedon plausible preference parameters yields extremely small capital
stocks.The inability of the life cycle nde1, by itself, to explain U.S.
wealth is a point that has been made by several authors (e.g., Kotlikoff and
Summerb(1981)). Thismodel provides further indication of the inadequacy
ofthepure life cycle nodel without bequests to explain observed rates of
capital accumulation. While the current nodel excludes bequests, the assump—-l I-
tionof a net positive government capital stock yields plausible magnitudes
for observed macroeconomic variables. While our modeling of private saving
ignores the significant intergenerational transfer behavior that appears to
arise in the U.S., it provides an important benchmark for considering such
models. In addition, it should be stressed that large masses of U.S. house—
holds could have the types of preferences assumed here, but simplyholdsmall
or zero amounts of wealth because of the particular shape of their age—wage
profile.
Webegin our analysis byexamining how the composition of the popula-
tionchanges dyer time for each of these transitions. Table 1 presents the
fractionof the population at different ages daring the demographic transition.
The top panel presents data for the bust transition,while the bottom paiel
considers the BBBtransition. In the busttransitionthe age structure flat-
tens smoothly over time until, in year 50, it is essentially flat, and equal
to its long run structure. The Bust—Boom—Bust transition bas a more compli-
cated picture, starting out similar to the straight bust, but maintaining
through year 50 a fairly steep age structure because of the rebound in the
birth rate. The Boom cohort is clearly evident in year IOts bulge in the
fraction of young adults between 20 and 4O and, again in year 110, in the
fraction of the population age 61 to 75.Thedifferent time patterns in age
structures in these two cases suggest that the BBB transition will take longer
to evidence large changes in macroeconomic variables, but will generate larger
swings in these variables as the boom cohort moves through the population.—15—
Table1
Population Age Structure in Transition
Bust Transition
Year/Cohort 1—20 2110 i—6o 61—75
0 .50 .28 .15 .07
20 .37 .36 .20 .09
50 .28 .28 .28 .16
70 .26 .27 .27 .20
110 .27 .27 .27 .2].
150 .27 .27 .27 .20
Bust—Boom-BustTransition
Year/Cohort 1—20 20—40 40—60 61—75
0 .50 .28 .15 .07
20 .4i .33 .18 .08
50 .40 .30 .19 .11
70 .27 .34 .26 .13
110 .25 .25 .25
150 .27 .27 .27 .20i6
This intuition is supported bythe resultsof the basic simulations of
theeconomy without Social Security,summarized in Table 2. In these simula—
tions we normalize the initial wage rate to unity and set the government surplus
(capital stock) so that the gross interest rate is approximately ten percent.
The stock of government capital per capita is held constant throughout each
simulation.
In the bust simulation wages rise and interest rates gradually fall
throughout the transition reflecting the increase in capital per worker as the
fraction of young workers, who own relatively little wealth, decreases. The
association of capital deepening with lower population growth rates dates at
leastfrom Solow's(1956) growth model with its Keynesian saving behavior.
The decline in marginal income tax rates arises because government consumption
per capita is held fixed, but the fraction of the population with no taxable
income, in this case, children, falls through time, Once the transition has
begun, saving rates immediately fall. They then rise through year 20 to a value
abovethat in the initial steady state. There follows a decline in saving
rates, which reach negative values in year 110. Between 110 and 150 the
saving rate rises to its ultimate steady state value of zero. The initial
drop in the saving rate is unrelated to concurrent demographic changes, which
in period one are still unimportant, but to general equilibrium
increases in future after tax wages. These projected increases in budget
opportunities produce higher current consumption and lower current saving.
Between years 1 and 20 the drop in fertility reduces the number of children and
the importance of their dissaving, i.e., consumption; by year twenty the frac——17—
Table 2
Characteristics of Demographic Transitions
(No Social Security)
Bust Transition
Saving Wage Interest Marginal Year Rate Rate Rate Tax Rate
0 7.6 1.00 9.9 15.0
1 6.1 1.00 9.9 13.0
5 6.6 1.00 10.0 12.4
10 7.4 1.00 10.0 11.8
20 7.9 1.02 7.4 11.6
50 3.0 1.10 7.3 10.6
70 —0.01 1.11 7.1 10.3
110 —1.5 1.11 7.1 10.5
130 0 1.11 7.1 10.6
150 0 1.11 7.1 10.6
Bust—Boom—BustTransition
Saving Wage Interest Marginal Year Rate Rate Rate Tax Rate
0 7.6 1.00 9.9 15.0
1 6.2 1.00 9.8 14.7
5 6.7 1.00 9.9 12.7
10 7.7 1.00 10.0 12.1
20 8.7 1.02 9.3 i4.i
50 4.3 1.04 8.9 11.8
70 6.2 1.06 8.3 9.9
110 —5.0 1.13 6.9 10.9
130 0 1.11 7.1 10.7
150 0 1.11 7.1 10.6—i8--
tion of the population between 20 and 60 has increased from 45 percent to
56 percent, and this group is doing more saving because of the reduced number
of months they must feed. By year TO, however, the decline in birth rates has
affected the size of the young and middle age adult saving population, so that
the only boom group remaining are the aged dissavers. This leads, tem-
porarily, to a slightly negative saving rate.
The EBB transition as suggested, occurs more slowly and is then
characterized by erratic swings in macroeconomic activity as the bulge cohort
ages. The wage rate rises gradually to 1.06 by year 10, rather than the 1.11 of
the bust transition. It then overshoots its long run level as the boom cohort,
with its large accumulated savings of capital, retires. Likewise, marginal tax
rates take longer to fall and undershoot their long run value. Saving rates
remain positive and quite high through year 70; they then fall precipitously
to —5.0 percent of income in year 110 before converging to zero.
The well—being of individuals alive during either of these tran—
compared to that of cohorts who die before there is any change
The method we use is to ask what additional fraction of life—




tobe as well off as a member of a particular transition cohort. Normally a
well defined measure, this approach has some ambiguity in the current context,
because the parent's utilityfunction depends on the consumption and number of
children.Our model does not, however, provide reasons for specified changes
in fertility. Hence, equating a decline in the number of children with a
decline in parental welfare seems rather arbitrary. In a more elaborate model
that fully described the fertility decision, a decline in the number of—19—
children could be associated with both negative and positive changes in paren-
tal welfare. For example, if children provide pleasure to their parents, but
changes in social customs make childbearing more difficult, this would imply a
loss in welfare not present if reduced fertility came about due to, say, an
income effect associated with increased living standards. We side—step this
problem by focusing on the welfare adults receive directly from their own con-
sumption and leisure. That is, our measure of welfare changes of transition
adult cohorts is the increase or decrease in resources (spent on own adult
consumption and leisure) that adults in the initial steady state would receive
to be left with the level of utility from adult consumption and leisure
enjoyed by particular transition cohorts during their aduithoods. This is
essentially the equivalent variation measure of the change in economic cir-
cumstances faced by a transition cohort.
In Table 8, we express these welfare effects as a percentage of the
lifetime resources of initial steady state cohorts. The cohort born in year
—75 (75 years prior to the date the transition begins) is the last generation
not affected by the transition. The first part of the table, labelled "bust"
shows the welfare effects of the transition under various fiscal regimes. The
first column corresponds to the basic transition without social security
discussed above. The drop in birth rates causes a large long run welfare gain
of 12.57 percent, about three—fourths of which is realized by those born in
year —10. The primary reason for this upward shift in welfareis the reduc-
tion in children per adult. As we are considering welfare measured in terms
of adult expenditure on consumption and leisure such a demographic shift per-
mits a higher level of welfare since adults now shift a greater fraction of—20—
their resources toward their own consumption and leisure. The corresponding
BBB transition, represented in the first column of the second part of Table 8,
evidences the same jump in welfare as birth rate declines, but also displays a
temporary welfare drop associated with the temporary rise in fertility.
We now consider the inclusion of unfunded Social Security in each of
these transitions. The baseline rdel of Social Security assumes a 60 percent
replacement rate and an initial age of benefit receipt of 65. Summary sta-
tistics for these simulations are given in Table 3. As expected, saving rates
are generally lower and interest rates higher in the presence of Social
Security. Aside from the payroll tax, the two simnlations with Social
Security behave rather similarly to their counterparts without Social Security
presented in Table 2. The presence of the payroll tax means that, as fer-
tility declines, part of the adult welfare gain previously discussed will be
offset by the increased ratio of beneficiaries to workers associated with
rising payroll taxes. This is evident if one compares the second column of
the two parts of Table 8, corresponding to the welfare effects under the two
transitions in the presence of social security. While the qualitative pat-
terns of welfare change are the same, cohorts gain uniformly less. About 45
percent of the long run gain is lost. The effect is smaller in the short run,
since the earlier generations escape the burden of higher social security
taxes.
Payroll tax rates are quite different in the bust and the bust—boom—
bust transitions. In the first, the number of retirees per worker increases
fairly smoothly, with the rise in the payroll tax similarly behaved. In the
second, the population bulge represented by the baby boomers holds down—21—
Table 3
Characteristics of Demographic Transitions
(With Social Security)
Bust Transition
Savings Wage Interest Marginal Payroll Year Rate Rate Rate Tax Rate Tax Rate
0 6.8 1.00 11.1 15.0 5.2
1 5.5 1.00 11.1 12.9 5.2
5 5.9 1.00 11.2 5.3
10 6.7 1.00 11.2 11.7 5.4
20 7.0 1.02 10.6 11.6 5.6
50 1.7 1.09 8. 10.8 10.1
70 —1.3 1.08 8.8 10.1 14.0
110 —1.5 1.07 9.1 10.1 15.0
130 0 1.07 9.0 10.3 13.9
150 0 1.07 9.0 10.3 13.9
Bust—Boom_Bust Transition
Saving Wage Interest Marginal Payroll Year Rate Rate Rate Tax Rate Tax Rate
0 6.8 1.00 11.1 15.0 5.2
1 5. 1.00 11.0 14.7 5.3
5 5.9 1.00 11.2 12.6 5.2
10 6.8 1.00 11.2 12.0 5.3
20 7.8 1.02 10.5 14.1 5.5
50 3.6 1.03 10.1 11.8 7.5
70 5.1 1.05 9.6 9.9 8.6
110 —5.6 1.08 8. 10.5 i8.
130 0 1.07 9.1 10.3 13.8
150 0 1.07 9.0 10.3 13.9—22—
payroll tax increases while they are working, and causes them to jump sharply
once this cohort retires. In year 110 the payroll tax rate is 18.7 percent,
almost 3.5 times the initial steady state value.
V. Social Security Po cResetothe DemographicTransition
Table )4 shows saving, wage, interest, and tax rates arising under
the two demographic transitions if Social Security's replacement rate is cut
in year zero from 60 to ho percent. These benefit cuts apply to all cohorts
receiving benefits at the time they are implemented. The table also presents
comparable figures for a gradual reduction in the replacement rate to ho per-
cent starting in year zero and ending in year 20. Table 3 indicates the time
paths of these variables when the replacement rate is held fixed. A quick
comparison of these two tables indicates that the Social Security tax rate is
quite sensitive to the benefit cut policy, while the impact on other variables
is relatively minor, Rather than rising to 13.9 percent, as in Table 3, the
long run Social Security tax rate in Table h increases from 5.2 percent to 9.2
percent. The Social Security tax rate is significantly lower throughout the
transition under the policy of immediately cutting the replacement rate than
in the transitions of Table 3.
The benefit cuts, by reducing the scale of unfunded Social Security,
generates a 3 percent larger pre—tax wage rate than would otherwise occur.
The additional capital deepening associated with this larger long run wage
rate explains the slightly larger saving rates in Table b compared with
those of Table 3. The affect of phasing in the replacement rate cut rather
than implementing it immediately is to leave the economy with roughly 20 per-
cent higher payroll tax rate rates during the first ten years of the tran——23—
Table 4
ImmediateCutinReplacement Ratefrom60% to 40%
Bust-Boom-Bust
Year S/Yw r tSS SLY w r TSS
0 6.81.0011.1 15.0 5.2 6.81.0011.1 15.0 5.2 1 6.61.0011.2 12.7 3.5 6.7 1.0011.1 14.5 3.5 5 6.8 1.00 11.1 12.3 3.5 6.8 1.0011.1 12.6 3.5 10 .21.01 10.9 11.9 3.6 7.2+ 1.0110.9 12.1 3•5 20 7.3 1.03 10.2 11.8 3.8 8.1 1.03 10.5 14.33.7 50 3.0 1.12 10.2 10.9 6.7 4.5 1.059.6 12.0 5.0 70 —1.1 i.ii8.0 10.2+ 9.4 5.4 1.069.2 10.1 5.8 100 —.3 1.118.2 10.9 9.4 —1.2+ 1.177.7 11.2 8.9 110 —1.5 1.108.2 10.5 10.0 —5.5 i.n8.i10.9 12.5 130 .0 1.108.4 10.6 9.2 —.1 1.108.4 10.7 9.2 io .01.108.4 10.69.2 —.01 1.108.410.7 9.2
Gradual(20 Year) Cut in Replacement Ratefrom 60% to 40%
Baby Bust Bust-Boom-Bust
Year SLY TSS S/Y TSS
0 6.81.0011.1 15.0 5.2 6.81.0011.1 15.0 5.2 1 6.2 1.00 11.2 12.8 4.7 6.3 1.0011.1 14.5 4.7 5 6.6 1.0011.2 12.3 4.2+ 6.6 1.0011.2 12.6 4.3 10 7.2 1.03 11.0 11.8 4.0 7.2+1.0011.0 12.1 3.9 20 7.41.1110.2 11.8 3.8 8.21.03 10.2 14.3 3.7 50 2.7 1.118.o 10.9 6.8 4.3 1.059.712.05.0 'ro —1.11.118.2 10.4 9.2+ 5.4 1.069.2 10.1 5.8 100 —.3 1.118.2 10.9 9.4 —1.41.137.711.28.9 110 —1.5 1.108.410.510.0 —.1 1.11 8.].10.912.5 130 .0 1.10 8.2+10.69.2 .1 1.108.410.79.2 150 .0 1.108.410.6 9.2 01.108.4 10.6 9.2—2 b—
sition. The welfare effects of these benefit cuts are predictable. For both
demographic transitions, the immediate cut in benefits causes a welfare loss
to older generations alive in year zero (Table 8), but a welfare improve-
ment for younger cohorts, even for those who are age twenty—five, and hence
already working, at the time of the change. In the long run, such a policy
leads to substantially greater welfare then under the policy of simply passively
adjusting social security tax rates to meet the benefits associated with
a 60 percent replacement rate.
An alternative to the explicit reduction in benefit levels would be
an increase in the retirement age. Table 5 presents the characteristics of
thedemographic transition for two such policies, an immediate increase in the
retirement age from 65to67,andthe same rise occuring in year 20, after
beingannounced in year zero. The welfare effects of the first of these poli-
cies is shown in the fifth column of Table 8. Both in terms of macroeconomic
and welfare effects, an immediate increase in the retirement age by two years
has a similar but smaller impact than the immediate 40 percent benefit cut.
In the long run, the payroll tax rate rises to 11.0 percent, higher than the
9.2 percent in the former case. Likewise, the long runwelfaregain of 8.91
percent is smaller than the previous gain of 10.21 percent. If one extrapola-
tes from our results, they suggest that maintenance of the original payroll
tax rate would require a benefit cut of close to 75 percent, and/or an
increase in the retirement age by 6 years.
Another alternative that has been suggested to reduce the growth in
payroll taxes is the taxation of social security benefits. Indeed, starting
with the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, higher income fami——25—
Table 5
Immediate Increase in Retirement Age from 65 to 67
Baby Bust Bust-Boom-Bust
Year iSS SLY tSS
0 6.8 1.00 11.1 15.0 5.2 6.8 1.00 11.1 15.0 5.2
1 5.9 1.00 11.2 12.8 5.2 6.0 1.00 11.1 114.6 5.2
5 6.4 1.00 11.2 13.3 14.2 6.3 1.00 11.2 12.6 14.1
10 7.01.0011.1 11.8 14.1 7.21.0011.112.04.1
20 7.3 1.02 10.3 11.7 14.3 8.0 1.03 10.3 14.3 .2
50 2.4 1.118.2 10.9 7.7 4.1 1.049.8 11.9 5.8
70 —1.2 1.108.14 10.3 11.6 .3 1.069.14 10.0 7.2
100 —.14 1.108.14 10.8 10.9 —1.5 1.127.8 11.1 10.1
110 —1.5 1.088.7 10.3 12.3 —.6 1.108.3 10.7 15.9
130 01.098.6 10.5 11.0 .1 1.098.7 10.5 11.1
150 01.098.6 10.5 11.0 01.098.6 10.6 11.0
Gradual Increase in Retirement Age from 6 to 67
Baby Bust Bust—Boom-Bust
TSS
0 6.8 1.00 11.1 15.0 5.2 6.81.00 11.'.15.0 5.2
1 5.6 1.00 11.1 12.9 5.2 5.71.00 11.0114.65.2
5 6.1 1.00 11.2 12.3 5.3 6.1 1.00 11.2 12.6 5.2
10 6.8 1.00 11.1 11.8 5.3 7.0 1.00 11.1 12.0 5.3
20 7.3 1.02 10.5 11.6 5.0 8.0 1.02 10.4 14.2 14.9
50 2.1 1.108.2 11.9 7.9 3.8 i.o49.9 11.9 5.8
70 —0.2 1.108.14 10.3 11.6 5.3 1.069.14 10.0 7.2
100 —0.3 1.108.4 10.8 10.9 —1.5 1.127.8 11.1 10.1
110 —1.51.088.7 10.3 12.3 —5.6 1.108.3 10.8 15.9
130 0.0 1.098.6 10.5 11.0 1.2 1.098.7 10.511.0
150 0.0 1.098.6 10.5 11.0 01.098.6 10.6 11.0—26—
Table 6
ImmediateTaxation of Social Security Benefits
Baby Bust Bust-Boon-Bust
Year S/Y wr iSS S/I wr rSS
0 6.81.0011.115.0 6.0 6.8 1.00 11.1 15.0 6.0
1 5.81.0011.1 12.8 4.5 6.0 1.00 11.1 i1.614.5
6.2 1.00 11.2 12.3 .6 6.2 1.00 11.2 12.6 14.6
10 6.81,0011.1 11.8 14.7 7.01.00 11.1 12.1 14.7
20 7.1 1.02 10.14 11.7 5.0 7.91.0210.14 114.2 147
50 2.2 1.108.310.99.0 3.91.0149.9 11.9 6.6
70 —1.3 1.098.610.212.6 5.2 1.059.59.9 7.8
100 —0.14 1.098.610.712.6 —i.61.128.0 11.0 11.8
110 —1.5 1.088.9 10.2 13.5 —5.61.098.510.716.7
130 0.0 i.o88.8io.1412.5 0.1 1.08 8.9 10.14 12.14
150 0.0 1.088.8io.1412.5 0.0 1.088.810.512.5—27--
lies will face regular income taxation on half their social security benefits.
In Table 6, and the last column of Table 8, we show the effects of taxing
all social security benefits beginning at the start of the demographic
transition, with the receipts kept within the social security system to reduce
payroll taxes. Such a policy leads initially to reductions in social security
taxes, but in the long run has a smaller impact than any of the policies pre-
viously examined, because of the relatively low rate of income taxation. As
this suggests, the long run welfare impact of this policy is smaller than the
others, but generations reaching adulthood early in the transition actually do
almost as well as under the other policies.
Finally, we consider in Table 7 a policy that some have advocated as
a long run solution to the long run social security deficit: the accumulation
of a trust fund. The simulated policy involves a one—third surcharge on the
payroll tax for the first twenty years of the transition, proceeds of which
are contributed to the trust fund, i.e.; in the initial twenty year period this
policy raises revenues by one—third more than is necessary, in equilibrium, to
pay for current benefits. After year twenty the accumulated trust fund is held
constant per capita, and the income and principal beyond that needed to maintain
a constant per capita trust fund is used to help pay for benefits. Under this
policy the social security tax rate drops to essentially zero in year 20 of both
transitions and, as the retiree/worker ratio rises, significantly limits the
rise in the payroll tax. In each simulation, the long run payroll tax (8. per-
cent for the bust case, 8.8 percent for the EBB case) is the lowest of any of
the simulations presented. As one would expect, the trust fund transitions pro-
duce the highest long run welfare gains of any of the social security tran-—28—
Table 7
Accumulationof a SocialSecurity Trust Fund
Year S/YLt




0 6.81.0011.115.0 6.0 6.81.0011.115.0 6.0
1 5.91.0011.212.8 7.0 6.01.0011.1i4.6 7.0
5 6.41.0011.212.4 7.0 6.41.0011.212.7 7.0
10 7.21.0011.112.0 7.1 7.51.0011.112.3 7.1
20 7.51.0310.212.5 —0.0 8.51.0310.115.2 0.9
50 2.11.118.011.4 5.3 3.41.059.512.9 1.8
70 —1.41.118.110,9 8.3 5.31.079.010.7 3.6
100 —o.o1,118.1ii.4 8.8 —1.61.137.611.7 8.7
110 —1.51.108.311.0 9.2 —5.61.118.111.4 13.2
130 0.01.108.311.2 8.4 0.21.108.411.2 8.6

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































sitions considered (Table 8). At the same time, they are the only policy
simulations, excluding simply passively adjusting payroll tax rates, under which
each generation gains from the changes in fertility.
VI. and Conclusion
A central lesson of the simulations presented here is that demo-
graphic conditions are potentially very significant determinants of economic
performance and welfare. Indeed, the time path of demographic change domina-
tes the outcomes of each of the five social security policy transitions,
despite the fact that these five simulations involve significantly different
and quite substantive social security policy responses. The simulated
demographic transitions suggest that the swings in U.S. fertility currently
underwaycan have very major impacts on factor returns over the long runand
producequitepercipitious changes in saving rates in the short run. To place
our findings on demographic change in perspective, it should be noted that the
simulatedlong runchangesin factor returns andcapital—labor ratios from major
fertilitydeclines are of the same order of magnitude as the simulatedeffect of
entirelyabolishing unfunded social security. In comparison with the verycon-
siderable researchthat has been conducted concerning the saving impact of this
and other government fiscal policies, the effect of demographic change on saving
is a little studied phenomenon.
The presence of a social security system does have important affects
on the economic transition associated with either baby busts or cycles of baby
booms and busts; but the attendant financial squeeze placed on social security
in these transitions is of secondary importance with respect to the long run
levelof economic welfare. While payroll tax ratesmay rise dramatically,—31—
long run welfare is nonetheless substantially higher, as measured in terms
of equivalent increases in levels of adult consumption and leisure. This
reflects, in part, the fact that each adult parent has "fewer months to feed"
and, therefore, can enjoy a higher individual standard of living. In addition,
while the replacement fertility rate prevailing in the long run leaves more
elderly per capita in society, the sharp drop in children per capita means an
overall decline in the ratio of dependents to prime age workers in the eco-
nomy. For the government these changes potentially imply smallerdemandson
its regular fiscal operations (e.g., educational expenditures) which we model
here as involving a fixed level of government consumption expenditure per
capita. In our model the marginal income tax rate used to finance this spending
falls from 15 percent to roughly 10.5 percent in each of the simulations in
response to the lower overall dependency ratio. Hence, while the typical worker
must support more elderly through social security, he (she) supports fewer
children, both directly as a parent and indirectly as an income taxpayer. A
glance at Table 3 indicates that under a passive policy of adjusting social
security payroll taxes, combined income and payroll tax rates rise from an ini-
tial 20.2 percent to a long run value of 24.2 percent. Had the income tax rate
not dropped to 10.3 percent, the combined long run tax rate would have equaled
28.9 percent.
While the combined long run tax rate is 4.2 percentage points higher
in this simulation, the pre—tax wage rises by 1percentreflecting the signifi-
cant increase in capital intensity associated with the long run decline in fer-
tility rates. It is this general equilibrium impact on factor returns that is
primarily responsible for the higher long run level of welfare.—32--
Although reasonable alterations in social security policy appear
incapable of significantly altering the basic economic impact of substantial
demographic swings, the particular choice of social security policy is
nonetheless quite important. In comparison with simply allowing payroll taxes
to adjust upwards to meet required benefit payments, major reductions in
replacement rates, major increases in the retirement age, or the accumulation
of a significant trust fund are all policies that can raise the long runlevel
of welfare by an amount equivalent to almost 4percentof lifetime expenditure
on consumption and leisure. A I percent long runwelfareincrease is a large
number when compared with the simulated long runwelfareeffects of a variety
of majorfiscalpolicy changes. Thepotentiallong runwelfaregain is not,
however, freely obtained; rather, such long runwelfaregains come at the
price of reductions in the welfare of transition cohorts, typically those
alive at the time of the demographic change as well as those born within 25
years of the initial date of the change. Hence the choice of social security
policy in the midst of the demographic transition is of considerable impor-
tance to the intergenerational distribution of welfare.—33—
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